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State Dept. review completed

Contribution to Financial Sitrep 21 May 85

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Poland

According to Embassy reporting, rescheduling negotiations with the Paris Club on 25-26 April remain at an impasse due to Polish failure to pay all creditors the late interest charges on the 1981 rescheduling agreement. Polish negotiators had previously assured the unpaid creditors -- the West Germans, Canadians, Austrians, Italians, Japanese, British, Spanish, Swedish, Dutch and French--that Warsaw would settle the outstanding interest which had been due prior to the March meeting. The Poles emphasized, however, that they were unwilling to sign the 1982-84 agreement until they had assurances of new financing. Meanwhile, Paris Club chairman Trichet urged creditors to reach agreement on the terms for rescheduling 1985 maturities. This could be initialled when the Poles signed the 1982-84 agreement and paid the remaining 50 percent of 1981 The 1985 agreement, however, should not be finalized arrears. until the Poles signed all bilateral agreements pertaining to the 1982-84 accord. 25X1

Most Western governments are unwilling to consider granting credits to Poland until after Warsaw signs the 1982-84 and 1985 rescheduling agreements, according to a survey of finance ministries by various US embassies. If the accords are signed, 25X1 France plans to grant \$10 million in short term credits and will consider granting somewhat less than \$10 million to finance

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	exports of gapital goods. West Cormons will sweet 620 will be				
	exports of capital goods; West Germany will grant \$30 million in				
	new credits, and Switzerland \$20 million in export credit				
	guarantees. Other countries, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark,				
	Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands will make decisions on Polish				
	requests when the agreements are signed. The Japanese and				
	Canadian governments, however, told US officials that they had no	05)//			
	intention of extending new credits at this time.	25 X 1			
25 X 1	Polish				
	officials severely criticized Polish negotiator Karcz over his				
	failure to obtain credits from Paris Club members and attacked				
	the Polish application to join the IMF.	25 X 1			
	if no new credits are forthcoming, Poland is unlikely to	25 X 1			
	sign the 1982-84 rescheduling agreement. If that happened, Karcz				
	would be replaced and the Polish government would use this excuse				
	to string out negotiations. Polish leader Jaruzelski still				
	supports the Polish application for readmission to the IMF, but				
	some Polish officials are concerned about possible Soviet				
	opposition to membership.	25X1			
25 X 1	the Polish government has	4			
	no idea how or when the debt might be repaid. Warsaw will try to				
	postpone debt repayments at least 15-20 years, and at the same				
	time, lobby for several billion dollars worth of credits. One				
	top-level Polish official claimed that even at the beginning of				
	the next century Poland would be incapable of repaying its large				
	debt.				
	Poland's hard currency surplus during the first four months				
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Hungary

Hungary is continuing to have success in raising money on Western credit markets to help cover its estimated 1985 debt 25X1 service payments of \$2.6 billion. by the end of April, Budapest had already lined up at least \$680 million in loans from US, Canadian, West European, and Japanese Budapest is also completing negotiations for a \$656 million World Bank cofinancing package to be used for modernization of the Hungarian petrochemical and food processing Signing of the loan is tentatively scheduled for 12 The new loans carry relatively favorable interest rates and maturities of at least six years. Budapest's strategy, according to a senior Hungarian economics official, is to lengthen the maturity structure of its commercial debt by using the new loans to repay existing shorter term debt. 25X1

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	25 X 1
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Vugoglavia	25 X 1
Yugoslavia	
The Yugoslavs are off to a poor start in fulfilling their	

hard currency trade plans for this year. Growth of industrial production slumped sharply in the first months of the year, largely as a result of exceptionally severe winter weather, and external payments performance deteriorated. Imports rose 5 percent as a result of increased oil purchases, while exports declined. By March, Belgrade has reduced its foreign exchange reserves by more than the increase built up in 1984, prompting the Governor of the National Bank on 14 May to warn Parliament of dire consequences for the economy—and unspecified government measures—if present trends are not reversed.

Already high inflation soared to an annual rate of more than 80 percent in April, prompting the government on 14 May to roll back prices and reimpose price controls on some goods and to restrict credit to some enterprises until they lower prices. The government balmed "opportunistic monopolists" for raising prices unjustifiably and claimed its decision was necessary to halt the rapid decline in living standards. Although the price controls apparently do not violate the new IMF standby program, they backtrack on Belgrade's commitment to price liberalization. Price controls on most industrial goods were lifted only last September in compliance with last year's Fund program. Yugoslavia's Western creditors are likely to take a hard view of its reversion to treating the symptoms rather than the causes of deep-seated economic problems, which may undercut Belgrade's campaign to ease oversight by the Fund in future reschedulings.

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